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Joe Borg  
The Maltese Presidency of the European 
Union 2017  
Every Presidency of the European Union seeks to leave its own mark in 
one way or another on one or more particular facets of the evolving process 
of the European Union. This becomes even more important for a Member 
State who, like my own country, Malta, has been at the helm for the first 
time.  
In my view, the three most prominent aspects of the Maltese Presidency are 
the setting out of a joint vision for the European Union for the years to 
come; the formal commencement of the Brexit process; and the particular 
focus on the EU’s Mediterranean Policy. 
The Future of the European Union 
I would like to begin by considering the fundamental question of the future 
of the European Union, and, more specifically, to ponder on the 
implications of the five different options put forward by the European 
Commission. I will also express my views on what I consider to be the way 
that guarantees an economically strong and a politically relevant Union 
within the context of the present-day realities. 
The history of the development of the European Union has been marked, 
since day one sixty years ago1, by a progression in fits and starts. On the 
negative side, it suffices to recall the European Defence Community2 that 
 
Internet resources, last date of access: 15 August 2017. 
 
1  The Treaty of Rome of 1957 which is the founding treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the founding treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC), were signed in Rome on the 25 March 1957 and they entered into force on 1 January 1958. 
2  Online at: aei.pitt.edu/5201/1/5201pdf. 
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never got off the ground in the early 1950s; the exchange rate shocks of the 
1970s, with the short-lived European currency snake3, the unsuccessful 
attempts at linking the Member States’ currencies together, the so called 
“Black Wednesday”4, and the collapse of the European Monetary System5. 
I can also mention the aborted accessions6 and rejections in referenda that 
took place in recent decades7; the failed attempt at a Constitution for the 
European Union8; and the very recent UK decision to withdraw from the 
EU, which I will be returning to later on. On the positive side, one can 
recall the step by step strengthening of the institutional structure of the 
Union. The original institutions were the Special Council of Ministers 
(today, the Council of the European Union)9, the High Authority (today, the 
European Commission)10, the General Assembly of the European Coal and 
 
3  The European currency snake in the tunnel was set up by virtue of the Basle Agreement which 
entered into force on the 24 April 1972. It allowed central banks of the then EEC Member States to 
buy and sell their respective currencies provided that the bilateral margins between their currencies 
did not exceed 2.25%. 
4  The 16 September 1992, when the British Conservative Government was forced to withdraw the 
pound sterling from the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
5  It was an arrangement established in 1979 under the Jenkins European Commission where most 
Member States of the EEC linked their currencies to prevent large fluctuations relative to one 
another. By 1998 the European Monetary System no longer remained a functional arrangement.  
6  One may recall the referendum held in Norway in 1972 which decided against the accession of 
Norway. The same thing happened in 1994 after that Norway attempted to accede to the EU for a 
second time. Greenland voted by referendum against remaining a member of the then European 
Communities in 1982. Switzerland voted against the opening of negotiations for EU membership in 
2001 and Iceland withdrew her application for membership in 2015. 
7  By way of example one may mention the following: (1) Denmark rejected the Maastricht Treaty by 
referendum in 1992 and then approved it by another referendum in 1993; (2) Ireland rejected the 
Nice Treaty by referendum in 2001 and then approved it by another referendum in 2002; (3) Ireland 
rejected the Treaty of Lisbon by referendum in 2008 and then approved it by another referendum in 
2009; (4) Denmark and Sweden rejected the Euro by referendum in 2002 and 2003 respectively. 
8  The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (OJC 310, 16.12.2004) was rejected by both 
France and the Netherlands by a referendum in each country. Both referenda were held in 2005. 
9  The first Council was the Special Council of Ministers which was set up in 1952 by virtue of the 
Treaty of Paris of 1951. Two new Councils were set up in 1958 as the Council of the European 
Economic Community and the Council of the European Atomic Energy Community by virtue of the 
two treaties signed in Rome in 1957, one setting up the EEC and the other setting up the EAEC. In 
1967 the three Councils were merged together as the Council of the European Communities by 
virtue of the Merger Treaty of 1965. It became known as the Council of the European Union in 1993 
by virtue of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
10  The High Authority was set up in 1952 by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1951. In 1958 two new 
Commissions were set up for the EEC and the EAEC by virtue of the two treaties signed in Rome in 
1957, one setting up the EEC and the other setting up the EAEC. The High Authority and the two 
Commissions were merged into one in 1967 by virtue of the Merger Treaty of 1965 and it became 
known as the Commission of the European Communities. It then became the European Commission 
in 2009 by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007.  
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Steel Community (today, the European Parliament)11, the Court of Justice 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (today, the Court of Justice of 
the European Union)12, the European Economic and Social Committee13 
and the European Investment Bank14. One may trace the setting up of a 
number of other institutions since the inception of what is today the 
European Union. The principal ones, by order of date of introduction, are – 
the European Council as an formal setup in 1974 and later on as an EU 
Institution in 200915; the European Court of Auditors in 197716; the General 
Court (formerly known as the Court of First Instance) in 1988 17 ; the 
European Committee of the Regions in 199418; the European Ombudsman 
in 199519; the Office of High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in 1997 which became the Office of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in 
200920; the European Central Bank in 199821; and the Office of full-time 
President of the European Council in 200922.  
 
11  The Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community was set up in 1952 by virtue of 
the Treaty of Paris of 1951. In 1958, it was renamed the European Parliamentary Assembly with the 
advent of the EEC and the EAEC by virtue of the two Treaties signed in Rome in 1957. In 1962, it 
started calling itself the European Parliament. This designation was made official by the Single 
European Act of 1986.  
12  The Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Community was set up in 1952 by virtue of the 
Treaty of Paris of 1951. As of 1958 it was renamed the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities with the advent of the EEC and the EAEC by virtue of the two treaties signed in Rome 
in 1957, one setting up the EEC and the other setting up the EAEC. It became known as the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in 2009 by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. 
13  It was established in 1958 by virtue of the Treaty of Rome of 1957. 
14  It was established in 1958 by virtue of the Treaty of Rome of 1957. 
15  The first informal Summit of the EU (then EC) heads of state or government was held in February 
1961.The summits were only formalised in 1974 by agreement reached in the December Summit of 
that year and the inaugural European Council, as it became known, took place in 1975. It gained 
treaty status with effect from 1987 since it was included in the Single European Act of 1986. Its role 
was then defined in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The European Council officially acquired the 
status of an EU Institution with effect from 2009, by virtue of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007. 
16  It was created by the Budgetary Treaty of 1975 and was formally established in 1977. It acquired the 
status of an Institution by virtue of the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. 
17  It was set up by a Council decision of 1988 and it began functioning in 1989. Prior to the coming 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 it was known as the Court of First Instance. 
18  It was set up in 1994 by virtue of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
19  The office was established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The first Ombudsman was elected by 
the European Parliament in 1995. 
20  The post was introduced by virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 as the High Representative 
for Common Foreign and Security Policy. It was changed to the Office of the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security in 2009 by virtue of the Lisbon Treaty of 2007. The post 
is assisted by the European External Action Service set up in 2010. 
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One should also mention the introduction of direct elections to the 
European Parliament in 197923, the Single European Act in 198624 which 
set in motion the creation of a single market by 1992, the Maastricht Treaty 
of 199225, known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU)26, which created 
the European Union with its three pillars system consisting of a first pillar, 
made up of what used to be the three communities, and two other pillars 
being the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home 
Affairs. The Maastricht Treaty also led to the creation of the single 
European currency – the Euro in 1999. Next came the Amsterdam Treaty in 
199727 which introduced the office of High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. The Nice Treaty of 2001 28  followed. It 
reformed the institutional structure of the European Union to be able to 
withstand the Eastward expansion. This was followed by the Lisbon Treaty 
of 2007 29 . It brought with it more qualified majority voting, a more 
powerful European Parliament, the setting up of the Office of full-time 
President of the European Council, and of the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as we know them today, and 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a legally binding instrument. The 
advancement of the European Union has had its fair share of ups and 
 
21  The European Central Bank is the successor of the European Monetary Institute which in turn 
replaced the earlier European Monetary Co-operation Fund. It was introduced by virtue of the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 but was established in 1998 and started exercising its full powers with the 
introduction of the Euro on the 1 January 1999. 
22  The first meeting of the EU (then EC) heads of state or government was held in 1961 as an informal 
Summit. It was formalised in 1974 (see ft. note 16). From 1975 to 2009 the head of the European 
Council was an unofficial position (often referred to as President-in-Office) held by the head of state 
or government of the Member State holding the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union. Since the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 a full-time President of the European Council is appointed 
for a two-and-a-half year term (extendable once for another term). The first such President took 
office on the 1 December 2009.  
23  They were introduced by a Decision of the then Council of the European Communities of 1976 (OJL 
278, 8.10.1976, p. 5) relating to the Act concerning the election of representatives of the Assembly 
(as the European Parliament was then still officially called) by direct universal suffrage. The first 
European direct elections were set for the 7-10 June 1979 by the Copenhagen European Council of 
April 1978. 
24  OJL 169, 29.06.1987. 
25  OJC 191, 29.07.1992. 
26  The TEU (effective since 1993) is one of the two principal treaties on which the EU is based. The 
other is the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), that is, the Treaty of Rome, 
effective since 1958. 
27  OJC 340, 10.11.1997. 
28  OJC 80, 10.03.2001. 
29  OJC 306, 17.12.2007. 
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downs but it has always managed to land on its feet. It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that we are now at another such stage. What comes as a 
surprise is the feeling of urgency that pervades the whole atmosphere 
concerning the future of the EU. The Brexit referendum result has, in no 
small way, contributed to this sense of urgency. 
Since the debacle of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe30 
any idea on the formulation of a Constitution for the EU has been all but 
abandoned. At the time, there was a realistic possibility that the 
Constitutional Treaty, which had been so painstakingly drawn up, would 
see the light of day since the Union was then passing through a period of 
significant economic performance and of unprecedented enlargement. The 
negative referendum results in France and the Netherlands, two of the 
original six, dashed all hopes. They were considered to be the death knell 
of any constitutional aspirations for the Union. It was manifestly clear that 
if a Constitution was not achievable in such favourable circumstances it 
would certainly be impossible to achieve later on. 
After a period of reflection, a makeshift arrangement, retaining whatever 
could be salvaged from the aborted Nice Treaty, was worked out for the 
future Union, in the form of the Lisbon Treaty, which was not without its 
own hiccups.  
The Lisbon Treaty was ushered in, with an atmosphere of gloom and doom 
prevailing within the European Union, because of the severe global 
financial and economic crises that hit Europe with full force at the time and 
that were wreaking havoc to our established way of life and to our well-
being.  
Has Brexit now changed the way of looking at things, of looking at the way 
forward for the European Union? Is it possible that we ought now to 
consider, once again, the option of further deepening beyond Lisbon, of 
giving a constitutional framework to the Union? Immediately after the UK 
voted to leave the European Union on the 23 June 2016, a reflection on the 
 
30  See ft. note 9. 
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future of the EU with 27 Member States commenced31. In August and 
September, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, carried 
out consultations with all the EU Leaders on the main priorities for the EU. 
The process was then formally launched in Bratislava in September 201632. 
It led to the constructive discussions held during the meeting of the Heads 
of State and Government in Malta on the 3 February of this year33, in 
preparation for the meeting held in Rome 34 , to celebrate the 60th 
anniversary of the Rome Treaties, which took place on the 25 March. It 
was within this scenario that the European Commission presented a White 
Paper on the Future of Europe35 on the 1st March in which it set out the 
main challenges and opportunities for Europe in the coming decade and 
presented five alternative paths that the Union could follow by 2025. 
I am sure you have already heard and read a lot about these five alternative 
scenarios but allow me to say a few words about each one of them before I 
say what, in my own view, may be the way forward if we believe in and 
want to have a free and united Europe, as acclaimed by Altiero Spinelli and 
Ernesto Rossi in their manifesto drawn up during the Second World War 
while they were being kept as political prisoners in the isle of Ventotene36.  
The first alternative proposes the carrying on of business as usual. In other 
words, it means, in essence, that we ignore what is happening around us, 
that we close our eyes to the prevailing negative perception regarding the 
 
31  Informal meeting of the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 29 June 2016, on the way 
forward after the referendum in the UK. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
en/press/press-releases/2016/06/29-27ms-informal-meeting-statement/. 
32  Bratislava Informal meeting of the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, 16 September 2016, which 
launched a political reflection on further development of an EU with 27 Member States. Online at:  
 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2016/09/16-informal-meeting/. 
33  Informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government in Malta, 3 February 2017, which built upon 
the political reflection on the future of the EU with 27 Member States. Online at:  
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2017/02/03-informal meeting. 
34  Rome, 25/03/2017, Meeting of the EU Heads of State or Government held on the occasion of the 
60th anniversary of the Rome Treaty. Online at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-
council/2017/02/25. At the end of the celebrations the Leaders adopted and signed the Rome 
Declaration setting out a joint vision for the years to come. Online at: 
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press releases/2017/03/25. 
35  White Paper on the Future of Europe – Reflections and scenarios for the EU 27 by 2025 [COM 
2017(2025) final]. Online at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-385_en.html 
(eur-lex-europa.eu/content/news/white_ paper.html). 
36  Taken from the opening words of the introduction of the White Paper on the Future of Europe – ft. 
note 36, pg. 2. 
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European Union and its institutions and that we seek to move ahead by 
focusing on delivering the positive reform agenda in the spirit of the 
Commission’s New Start for Europe of 2014 37 , hoping that finally 
everyone will see the light. This sounds very much like having more of the 
same. I must admit I am not one who would opt for such a way forward 
since I consider the European Union as being still in an evolving phase.   
The second offers as a possible solution setting the clock back. This would 
entail that all that has been achieved, which does not fall within the 
parameters of the Single Market, is swept aside and we refocus our 
attention fully and exclusively on achieving and maintaining the Single 
Market, hoping that the European citizen would be happy with this and no 
more. This, to me, is a case of sounding the retreat. I would certainly not 
favour seeking a solution by moving backwards. 
Scenario three envisages a situation where those who would like to do 
more would be able to do more. This would, in effect, mean that the 
European Union would proceed along the same lines it is following today 
but Member States who are willing could do more together in specific areas 
such as defence, internal security or social matters, thereby countenancing 
one or more “coalitions of the willing”. Within this third scenario such 
coalitions would be given a formal framework. Allow me to say that I do 
not consider it to be the ideal way ahead for the European Union, albeit it 
may be the offspring of necessity. 
To some extent, what is being proposed in this scenario has already 
happened and is happening. It suffices to recall here the, so called, EU opt-
outs38, the foremost of which being the Euro Area (made up of nineteen of 
the Member States) 39  and Schengen (made up of twenty-two of the 
 
37  A new start for Europe – My agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change. Political 
Guidelines for the next European Commission. Opening Statement made by Jean-Claude Juncker, 
candidate for President of the European Commission, in the European Parliament plenary session, 
Strasbourg, 15 July 2014.  
38  Online at: eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/opting_out.html. 
39  What is the Euro Area? Online at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/euro-area/what-
euro-area_en. The UK and Denmark negotiated an opt-out under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. The 
19 Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Spain. 
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Member States but also of the four EFTA States)40. Mention should also be 
made of the possibility of the enhanced cooperation procedure introduced 
in 1999 by means of the Amsterdam Treaty, simplified in 2003 by means 
of the Nice Treaty and then extended to include defence in 2009 by means 
of the Lisbon Treaty41. This procedure has been resorted to in the areas of 
patents (with 26 Member States)42, divorce law (with 17 Member States)43 
and most recently in that of Property Regime Rules (with 18 Member 
States)44.  It is in the pipeline in two other areas, which are that of Financial 
Transaction Tax (with 10 Member States) 45 , and the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office which was given the green light by the European 
Council of the 9 March of this year (with 17 Member States)46. The Lisbon 
Treaty also envisages the possibility of the establishment of Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO)47 between willing Member States in the 
defence field. The purpose is for such States to strengthen their cooperation 
in military matters. Up to now, PESCO has not been activated. 
 
40  Schengen Area – European Commission. Online at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en. Schengen Area Countries List. Online at:  
https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/. The Schengen Agreement was 
signed on the 14 June 1985 by 5 of the then 10 EEC Member States. In 1990 the Agreement was 
supplemented by the Schengen Convention. They were incorporated into EU Law by the 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. The 22 E.U. Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. The 
4 E.F.T.A. States are: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 
41  Online at: en.euabc.com/word/332; eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/enhanced_cooperation.htm; 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_cooperation.  
42  Online at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unitary_patent. The participating Member States are: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
43  Online at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Applicable_divorce_law_regulation. The participating 
Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain. 
44 Online at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/06/09-property-regimmes-for-
international-couples/. The 18 Member States are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
45  Online at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_financial_transaction_tax. The 10 
Member States are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Spain. 
46  Online at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/08-eppo/. The 18 Member 
States are Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. 
47  Online at: eur-lex-europa.eu/summary/glossary/permanent_structured_cooperation.html.  
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The fourth alternative sees the Union doing less but more efficiently. The 
focus would be on delivering more, and faster, in selected policy areas, 
while doing less in those areas which are perceived not to have an added 
value. I consider this to be a variant of the second scenario which focuses 
exclusively on the Single Market. I would think that the Single Market 
would be an area where more is done and faster, whereas other areas 
considered as less relevant from a European perspective or where progress 
is extremely difficult to achieve would be left aside. The advantage of this 
alternative over the second is that it is not restricted to the Single Market so 
that other policy areas could be selected for placement on the fast track. 
Having said this, I still consider it as falling far short of the political 
aspirations of the European Union. 
The last scenario is that of doing much more together. According to this 
scenario all Member States together will “share more power, resources and 
decision-making across the board”48. Decisions would be agreed and taken 
faster at European level and would be rapidly enforced. In my view, it is 
this option that would seek to fulfil the aspirations of the founding fathers 
of the European Union and that would seek to achieve a political Union. 
The option to be selected very much depends on what the objectives of the 
Member States today are. Has the time come to revisit the failed attempt at 
a Constitution for the European Union or has it become an impossible task? 
I would like to express my own personal views here, and what I hope my 
country would do. Because I firmly believe in a strong Union on all fronts 
– the political, economic, social and environmental front; because I also 
believe that a more cohesive Union means a stronger Union; I am 
convinced that it is preferable for all component Members to move forward 
together. I therefore consider the fifth scenario as the one that is the best 
suited to achieve this. 
Member States, together with the EU Institutions, should leave no stone 
unturned in their quest to attain such a result. It is regrettable that certain 
Member States who believe in a strong Union appear to have already given 
up. I would expect those who are more intent to have a loose form of Union 
 
48  Ft. note 36 [Com 2017 (2025) final] pg. 15.  
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not to show much interest, but it is disappointing that those who are not, 
appear to have thrown-in the towel. 
I would opt for the third scenario (that is, those who want more do more) if, 
and only if, the last scenario proves impossible to achieve. In such an 
eventuality, I would hope that within the resulting matrix, or “concentric 
circles”, or “variable geometric set-up”, my own country would exhibit the 
necessary determination to place itself at the very core since it is only in 
this way that Member States, and the smaller ones, in particular, would be 
able to maintain their relevance on the international front. 
A strong Union, a political Union, a Union that would be in a position to 
match the political and economic strengths of the key players in the global 
scene, needs to be more united not less united. It needs to demonstrate that 
it is more efficient and more effective and not that it is just a loose entity 
capable of deciding only on certain matters and of taking a position on 
limited aspects and, more often than not, when it is already somewhat late 
in the day. 
To achieve this, the Union must revisit its institutional structures with a 
view to putting an end to the inadequacies, the bottlenecks that exist and 
with the aim of making them leaner and more efficient; and also with a 
view to addressing any remaining democratic deficit within the EU. If the 
European Commission ought to be strengthened further to make it resemble 
a national government more closely in the way it functions then let’s do it. 
If this would necessitate a change in the manner of selection of the 
Commissioners – if electing Commissioners gives more democratic 
legitimacy to the Commission – then let us consider how we can bring this 
about; if it also means a reduction in the number of Commissioners then so 
be it. After all, any further expansion of the European Union cannot 
countenance a further equivalent increase of Commissioners without a 
dilution of their individual powers such as to render them, or at least a good 
number of them, nonentities, or almost. I am certain that solutions can be 
found on the lines of the formula worked out in the draft Constitution for 
Europe of 2004 49  or that some other formulation based on egalitarian 
 
49  See ft. note 9. 
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representation of Member States can be hammered out in a manner that 
would ensure acceptance by all Member States.  
If the European Parliament, which is the direct representative of the 
European citizen, should have more legislative power, if the requirement of 
unanimity within the Council of Ministers on matters which require a 
decision at European level needs to be done away with, then let us do it, 
for, after all, the strength of the Union should not continue to be held 
hostage to the inward-looking considerations of individual Member States. 
Allow me to also say that we have too many Presidents of the EU – The 
President of the European Commission, the President of the European 
Parliament, The President of the European Council and the President of the 
Council of the European Union. My perception is that very often they end 
up, gracefully or not so gracefully, tripping on one another or stepping on 
each other’s toes. We need to address this. If we do not we will keep 
portraying the image, and in many cases the reality, of a ship with many 
captains which, consequently, sometimes floats along without proper 
compass bearings. 
It is becoming much more of a regular feature to see the German 
Chancellor and the French President take common stands even on matters 
that are of EU relevance. Does this convey the right message with regard to 
unity of action at EU level? Is it the result of necessity because the EU is 
too slow moving? Would it continue to happen if, instead of having 
different EU Presidents each vying to gain more strength or to steal the 
show, the EU were to be led by one executive President who would have 
the power to act on behalf of all, without needing to plod through a whole 
labyrinth of procedures and red tape. Today, on many issues the smaller 
States are left out of the picture and only the very large feature. With such a 
figure, all Member States, both large and small, would be properly 
represented. 
Does the European Union need its own Security and Defence setup as 
distinct from the individual security and defence components of the 
individual constituent members? My reply is a firm yes. Although more is 
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being done today than what was considered possible up to a few years ago, 
we are still weak, on both counts.  
The European Council of the 22 and 23 June of this year agreed on the 
need to launch the PESCO50 in an inclusive and ambitious way so as to 
strengthen European Security and Defence. Is this enough? I think not; 
although it is a step in the right direction. With the rise in terrorism; with 
the increase in tensions and with the regional instability that abounds 
around us; with the threats being posed to international peace and security 
with the likes of North Korea; it is imperative that the European Union 
formulates and builds its own security and defence mechanisms. I would 
here like to refer to my country’s position. Malta has a neutrality provision 
enshrined within her Constitution. Apart from the question concerning the 
continued relevance of neutrality in today’s world, it is not acceptable that 
because of a position on the matter that is found within one Member State, 
the whole of the European Union is held back from progressing further on 
security and defence, or, for that matter, in other area where it can and is 
very often expected to be active. Our neutrality is our concern and if we 
want to be a core part of the European Union as it continues to further 
evolve we have to address it, and not the other way around. 
Is the time ripe to consider a common finance minister for the Euro area 
and a European budget for the currency union? On the 20 June of this year, 
Chancellor Merkel said she was open to the idea of a common finance 
minister and that “one can indeed consider a European budget if it is clear 
that structures are really strengthened and this is used to sensible ends.”51 
In what I have been saying on the need for institutional reform and on a 
stronger Union, I have purposely avoided the use of the word “Federal” 
since a federal construction for the European Union raises concerns about 
loss of identity, the relinquishment of sovereignty and so on. The realities 
 
50  Ibid ft. note 48; European Council meeting (22 and 23 June 2017) – Conclusions, Title I – Security 
and Defence – paragraph 8. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/ 
2017/06/23-euco-conclusions/. 
51  Reuters report of the 20 June 2017 entitled “Merkel urges EU to stick together after Brexit talks 
launched”, reproduced in the Times of Malta online issue of the 22 June 2017. Online at: 
https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170620/world/merkel-urges-eu-to-stick-together-
after-brexit-talks-launched.651231. 
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of the European Union are such that a solution should be sought, to achieve 
a further deepening and to bring about further integration, by skirting 
around the term “Federal” and opting for so called sui generis or home-
grown ways forward, albeit they may closely resemble and at times be 
modelled on federal structures elsewhere.  
With the exception of the UK, which has opted out, the biggest Member 
States are giving clear messages in favour of further integration, of a deeper 
Union. They are willing to share their individual sovereignty to attain the 
larger picture. Certain smaller Member States are more cautious and are 
afraid that more integration would translate to a loss of their individual 
sovereignty and independence. They fear they would be engulfed by the 
larger ones, that for the larger Members sharing sovereignty in effect 
means further strengthening of sovereignty by the sheer force of added 
numbers, whereas for them it would mean a weakening, a dilution of their 
strength and their relevance. Our experience within the Union has been 
quite the opposite. We have managed to punch, as they say, far above our 
weight – and we are the smallest of the lot. 
BREXIT   
Having expressed my thoughts on the future of the European Union, I 
would now like to consider the BREXIT saga as it has unfolded so far. 
In the referendum that was held in the UK on the 23 June of last year, the 
people of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union52. This 
result was quite unexpected, or was it? When one factors in the years on 
years of negative, and at times destructive, propaganda against the 
European Union, thrown at the British public by the so-called tabloids, it 
should not have been so unexpected. 
This phenomenon which, up to some time ago, was almost exclusive to the 
UK is now quite a regular feature in many other parts of the European 
 
52  The electorate was 46,501,241; the turnout was 72.2 %; the rejected ballots were 0.056 %. Over the 
whole of the United Kingdom those who voted to leave were 51.9 %. Those who voted to leave in 
England were 53.4 %, in Northern Ireland they were 44.2 %, in Scotland they were 38.0 % and in 
Wales they were 52.2 %. Online at: http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results. 
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Union. It is, in my view, imperative that this malaise is addressed with full 
force so as to curb it before more harm is done. The habit of blaming 
Brussels for all that goes wrong while taking credit for all successes at 
home has already proved damaging. All this needs to change and it must be 
done sooner rather than later.  
Going back to Brexit, the United Kingdom handed over the letter which set 
in motion the negotiations envisaging her exit from the European Union on 
the 29 March of this year53. It was made very clear that the UK would like 
to seek a new “deep and special partnership”54 and that the terms of such a 
partnership should be agreed alongside those of the UK’s withdrawal from 
the European Union. This so called “deep and special partnership” was 
explained as being one “that takes in both economic and security 
cooperation”55. The UK spelled out that it “does not seek membership of 
the single market”56, but that it is after “a bold and ambitious Free Trade 
Agreement”57 which “covers sectors crucial to our linked economies such 
as financial services and network industries”58. 
It is abundantly clear that the UK does not want to have anything to do with 
any part of the freedom of movement of persons and of workers, in 
particular. It would like to be able to pick and choose what it may of the 
other three freedoms, especially those aspects that suit its economy best. 
While saying that: “we understand and respect your position that the four 
freedoms of the single market are indivisible and there can be no ‘cherry 
picking’” 59 , they proceed to propose just that. The UK also wants to 
maintain cooperation in the field of security. It considers that “Europe’s 
security is more fragile today than at any time since the end of the Cold 
War.”60 The UK is offering such security cooperation since “weakening our 
cooperation for the prosperity and protection of our citizens would be a 
 
53  Online at: news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/29_03_17_article50.pdf. 
54  Ibid ft. note 54 at page 2. 
55  Ibid ft. note 54 at page 3. 
56  Ibid ft. note 54 at page 4. 
57  Ibid ft. note 54 at page 5. 
58  Ibid ft. note 54 at page 5. 
59  Ibid ft. note 54 at page 4. 
60  Ibid ft. note 54 at page 6. 
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costly mistake” 61 , knowing full well that, with the terrorist attacks in 
France, Belgium, Germany and Sweden, this is the foremost concern of the 
European Union. If security cooperation is being offered as the quid pro 
quo for the economic partnership being sought, it has to be said that the UK 
is itself not, however, free from security concerns, as the latest string of 
terrorist attacks in UK amply show. 
Reaching agreement on the economic partnership is an extremely difficult 
nut to crack and the offer for security cooperation between the EU and the 
UK may not be a compelling enough reason for the EU to bend over 
backwards to accommodate the UK since, after all, security cooperation is 
in the interests of both parties and both will stand to gain considerably from 
it. One may safely assume that both would seek to maintain such 
cooperation for reasons of mutual interest independently of any other 
consideration.  
Reaching such an agreement within the time frame of two years, that is 
within the same time frame set out in the Treaty on European Union for 
withdrawal discussions62, is very ambitious indeed. If agreement is not 
reached by the end of March 201963, the default position would be that 
trade between the UK and the EU would be on World Trade Organisation 
terms and nothing more. This would be a severe blow to both sides but, 
allow me to foretell that it would be a more severe blow to the UK even if 
simply because of the sheer difference in size between the UK’s internal 
market and that of the EU. 
The United Kingdom is one of the four largest Member States within the 
Union. Yet, it is quite small in its dimensions and its population when 
placed side by side with the likes of China, India, the United States, and 
why not Brazil and Russia. Will the UK retain the relevance on the world 
stage that it enjoys today if it tries to go it alone? Will its economic strength 
continue unabated if it proceeds on its own? Or will it suffer for it?  
 
61  Ibid ft. note 54 at page 6. 
62  Article 50 (3) TEU. 
63  That is, two years from the 29 March 2017 being the date of the UK’s letter triggering article 50 
TEU (the article regulating the withdrawal of a Member State from the European Union). 
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I am not so convinced that any hand-holding by the United States and that 
any trade and other economic arrangements that it might work out with the 
EU; that any pious aspirations of breathing a new life into the so called 
“Commonwealth of Nations” 64 , formerly known as “The British 
Commonwealth”; will give to the UK what it will lose by opting out of the 
European Union.  
In the light of the Opinion delivered by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union on the 16 May of this year65 that the free trade agreement 
with Singapore cannot, in its current form, be concluded by the EU alone, 
and that it cannot take full effect until ratified by 38 national and regional 
parliaments across the EU,66 the prospects of a quick fix solution for the 
UK’s economic partnership with the EU have become much bleaker unless, 
of course, the UK seeks agreement solely on matters which fall within the 
exclusive competence of the EU67.  
Possibly because of the realization by the British government that 
negotiations are going to be extremely difficult, a little while after the 
submission of the letter for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, Prime 
Minister May decided to go for snap elections in order to seek to strengthen 
her hands both at home, because of the significant resistance she was 
encountering from various quarters, and with the negotiators sitting on the 
other side of the table.  
 
64  It is an intergovernmental organisation consisting of 52 Member States (the Maldives, which was 
the 53rd Member State left the Commonwealth in 2016), ranging from India with a population of 
1.26 billion people and Pakistan with almost 190 million people to Nauru and Tuvalu, each with a 
population of around 10,000 people and from Canada and Australia with an area of almost 10 
million km2 and over 7.5 million km2 respectively to Tuvalu and Nauru with an area of 26 km2 and 
21 km2 respectively. The Commonwealth Member States are mostly former territories of the 
erstwhile British Empire. Mozambique and Rwanda are the only two members who were never a 
British colony whereas Myanmar and Aden (part of what is now Yemen) are the only former British 
colonies who elected not to join the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth operates by consensus of 
the Member States and is organised through the Commonwealth Secretariat. The British monarch is 
the ceremonial head. Online at: thecommonwealth.org/member-countries; www.worldatlas.com/ 
articles/what-is-the-commonwealth.html; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of-Nations.   
65  Avis 2/15 Opinion of the Court ECLI:EU:C:2017:376. Online at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
documents.jsf?num=C-2/15. Online at: https://curia.europa.eu/jcons/upload/docs/application/pdf/ 
2017-05/cp170052.en.pdf.  
66  Online at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/singapore-trade-deal-cannot-be-
concluded-by-eu-alone-ecj-rules/. 
67  Online at: https://www.ft.com/content/f9cf18e4-3a1b-11e7-ac89-b01cc67cfeec. 
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By way of justification for calling early elections, Theresa May was quoted 
as saying that “it is the only way to guarantee certainty for the years ahead” 
that “Britain needed certainty, stability and strong leadership” and that “a 
decisive election victory would strengthen the Government’s hand in Brexit 
negotiations.”68 She hoped to boost her slim working majority in order to 
help pass both domestic and Brexit-linked legislation. 
The elections were held on the 8 of June. The result is quite the opposite of 
what Prime Minister May was hoping for. Instead of strengthening her 
majority, the UK has ended up with a hung Parliament. The Conservatives 
do not have a majority in the House of Commons and they must now rely 
on the qualified and somewhat tenuous support of the Northern Irish 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to be able to command the slightest 
absolute majority of the House. It is less than what the Conservatives on 
their own enjoyed before the elections. It, therefore, considerably weakens 
the UK’s negotiating position69. Will Theresa May survive beyond this 
year? Will the Government last the full term of the Brexit negotiations? 
Will it manage to strike a deal that will be good enough to garner the 
support of the UK Parliament? Will the EU negotiators be willing to help 
May save face?  
I have quite recently read a report prepared by New Financial entitled 
“What the rest of the EU thinks about Brexit and the City”70. The report 
contains a 10-point summary of the main concerns and priorities of the 
EU27 Member States ahead of the Brexit negotiations. The think tank 
scoured through hundreds of speeches, articles and reports from the EU27 
in an attempt to distil what policymakers and regulators in each Member 
State really think about Brexit.  
  
 
68  These three quotes are taken from the report of The Guardian of the 18 April 2017 entitled “Theresa 
May calls for UK general election on 8 June”. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/ 
2017/apr/18/theresa-may-uk-general-election-8-june. 
69  For an account of the UK election results see: www.bbc.com/news/election/2017/results; https://  
www.theguardian.com/politics/ng-interactive/2017/jun/08/live-uk-election-results-in-full-2017. 
70  Online at: newfinancial.eu/what-the-rest-of-the-eu-thinks-about-brexit-the-city/; newfinancial.eu/ 
wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2017.04-What-the-rest-of-the-EU-thinks-about-Brexit-New-
Financial.pdf. 
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Of the findings identified in the report I would like to mention the 
following, since they throw light on the whole negotiation process: 
‐ The UK will not be allowed to choose between the four freedoms; 
‐ Nothing will be agreed in any sector until everything has been agreed 
in all sectors; 
‐ The UK will face a tough negotiation process; 
‐ While there is little appetite to ‘punish’ the UK, the stance of some 
countries has hardened in recent months in response to ‘hard Brexit’ 
and the talk in the UK of ‘no deal is better than a bad deal’; 
‐ Negotiations will require a lot of give and take and will be more 
complex and more political than is thought in the UK; 
‐ Few people in the EU27 expect a deal to be agreed in less than two 
years; 
‐  The almost universal view in the EU27 is that a deal based on 
equivalence would not be appropriate and public support by 
policymakers within the EU for the sort of ‘enhanced equivalence’ 
regime for Banks71 that the UK has floated is very scarce; 
‐ Agreeing on financial services is going to be the toughest part of 
trade talks and getting a deal for the City is more important for the 
UK than for the EU27. It is a known fact that the UK needs a deal on 
financial services and really wants one on trade in goods; 
‐ Everyone agrees that some relocation of UK-based activity will be 
required; and 
‐ The UK will not be able to set lower taxes to attract business since it 
needs to raise revenue from taxes to cater for its budget deficit and 
furthermore it will have to adhere to global norms such as the OECD 
guidelines. 
 
71 “Loosely, equivalence means banks in the UK will be able to operate in the EU if relevant financial 
regulations in the two jurisdictions are deemed the same by the EU’s assessors. Unfortunately, 
equivalence can be withdrawn within 30 days and is open to manipulation for political purposes. 
What banks and the British government really want, therefore, is ‘enhanced equivalence’ or 
‘equivalence plus’…[where] the EU wouldn’t have the final word on equivalence and it wouldn’t be 
removable at short notice.”. eFinancialCareers, Sarah Butcher, 27 February 2017.  
http://news.efinancialcareers.com/uk-en/275400/enhanced-equivalence-brexit. 
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These findings reflect the position of the EU Institutions and of a large 
number of the Member State policymakers and regulators72. 
At this stage, I would like to make two other observations which I consider 
very relevant to this whole matter. On the one hand, linked to Brexit there 
is the whole question of the Independence of Scotland from the UK. The 
Scottish First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon is proposing a second 
independence referendum for around spring of 2019 which is by when the 
Brexit negotiations will have to be completed. She obtained the support of 
the Scottish Parliament for this on the eve of the date when the British 
Prime Minister presented the letter triggering the start of negotiations for 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU73. The connection between the respective 
dates is obvious. Has the negative performance of the SNP in the June 
elections dampened such aspirations? There is then also the question of 
Northern Ireland. If the reinstatement of the border between the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland were to rear its head as a result of a 
possible “no deal” between the EU and the UK, would the Northern Irish 
be tempted to go their own way or to join up with the Republic of Ireland 
or would they rather face the risk of, so to say, history repeating itself? And 
what about Gibraltar? All this complicates life for Theresa May, and for the 
British negotiators, beyond measure.  
On the other hand, the European Union will not be prepared to make life 
easy for the UK or to give it any concessions for free. Independently of it 
being a question of pride and quite apart  from the EU’s desire to project a 
show of strength, there is the consideration that if the European Union were 
to show weakness in negotiations; if it were to give special concessions to 
the UK; if it would appear as if the UK is having the cake and eating it at 
the same time; other Members, who are not in the EU because they really 
believe in the European project, but because of what they can get out of it, 
 
72  The feature that appeared in the online issue of the Times of Malta of the 8 May 2017 entitled 
“EU27: the Brexit issues” provides further information on the main findings of the report, including 
the position of the Member States and the EU Institutions on the different issues. Online at: 
https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170508/business-news/EU27-the-Brexit-issues-
647363. 
73  Severin Carrell, The Guardian online, 28 March 2017, “Scottish Parliament votes for second 
independence referendum”. Online at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/mar/28/ 
scottish-parliament-votes-for-second-independence-referendum-nicola-sturgeon. 
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may be tempted to follow suit. This would be extremely disruptive for the 
European Union. 
In the light of all this I would hazard an opinion that it would have been 
better all round for both sides if a face saving way were to be found 
whereby the Brexit process would be reversed so that the UK would remain 
part of the European Union. I am confident that the EU would not have any 
issue with this. The problem is very much on the side of the UK since its 
hands are tied by the referendum result. Is it possible to begin to fantasize 
that June’s election result in the UK can pave the way for Britain to change 
its decision to withdraw from the EU? Will the possibility of holding 
another referendum become a realistic alternative to what may turn out to 
be a really bad deal for the UK? Only time can tell!  
In her speech on the occasion of the opening of the British Parliament on 
the 21 June 2017, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth told lawmakers: “My 
government’s priority is to secure the best possible deal as the country 
leaves the European Union”74, and in introducing the policy plan, Prime 
Minister May said: “We need to get Brexit right. That means getting a deal 
which delivers the result of last year’s referendum and does so in a way 
that commands maximum public support.”75 A tall order indeed! 
Negotiations started on the 19 June of this year signalling that for the two 
negotiating teams it is business as usual. Agreement was reached on the 
timetable, on the organisation and on the priorities for negotiations. Both 
sides stressed their goodwill but acknowledged the huge complexity of the 
task and the tight deadline76. 
Negotiations will be divided into two parts. “The first will cover the most 
important and pressing aspects concerning the withdrawal of the UK from 
 
74  Reuters report of the 21 June 2017 entitled “Theresa May waters down manifesto pledges as Queen 
opens British parliament”, reproduced in the Times of Malta online issue of the same date. Online at: 
https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170621/world/theresa-may-waters-down-manifesto-
pledges-as-queen-opens-british.651296 - Reuters report.  
75  The same source given in ft. note 75. 
76  BBC News online, 19 June 2017, “Brexit negotiations: Barnier rules out concessions”. Online at: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-40321271. 
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the EU whereas the second will seek to shape the future relationship 
between the two sides”77. 
The status of the EU nationals living in the UK post Brexit and the single 
financial settlement are amongst the most important matters that have to be 
agreed first. It was no surprise therefore that in the European Council 
meeting of the 22 and 23 June, the British Prime Minister affirmed that the 
UK “wanted to offer ’certainty’ to the estimated 3 million EU expats living 
in the UK”78. Although details of the British proposal were revealed in a 
paper published by the UK government on the 26 of June79, this whole 
matter is still far from being resolved. There are two very thorny issues that 
need to be ironed out before any light may be seen at the end of the tunnel. 
These are the question of the cut-off date and that of the continued 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). British attitudes on the 
latter are far from conducive to an agreed way forward. It is enough to 
quote what a UK senior official was reported to have said on this matter: 
“We have been clear on the ECJ that we are taking back control of our own 
laws.”80  
Despite all this and more, negotiations appear to be moving forward in 
good spirit and in the hope that a mutually acceptable outcome will finally 
be ironed out. 
I recently got hold of an opinion piece written by Hans-Werner Sinn who is 
Professor Emeritus of the University of Munich titled “A two-speed post-
Brexit Europe is best avoided”81. I must admit that I beg to differ from 
some of the considerations he puts forward against a “two-speed” Europe 
as an option, and from his arguments in favour of the possibility of 
agreeing with the UK on free trade without the movement of people. 
 
77  Vanni Xuereb, Times of Malta online, 23 June 2017, “Brexit a year on”. Online at: 
https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170623/opinion/Brexit-a-year-on.651414. 
78  PA report of the 22 June 2017 entitled “Theresa May outlines plans on status of EU nationals living 
in UK post-Brexit”, reproduced in the Times of Malta online issue of the 23 June 2017. Online at: 
https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170622/world/theresa-may-outlines-plans-on-status-
of-eu-nationals-living-in-uk-post.651400. 
79  Online at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safeguarding-the-position-of-eu-citizens-in-
the-uk-and-uk-nationals-in-the-eu. 
80  Ibid ft. note 79. 
81  Financial Times, 16 April 2017, pg. 9. Online at: https://www.ft.com/content/e0051162- 
1ee0-11e7-b7d3-163f5a7f229c. 
Joe Borg  
22 
 
Having said this, he makes the very valid point that “Brexit destroys the 
European equilibrium rendering otiose minority rights in the European 
Council”82. He rightly says that a blocking minority needs 35% of the EU 
population. The group of so called “free traders” within the EU will no 
longer form a blocking minority between them with the exit of the UK 
whereas the Mediterranean countries who have traditionally been 
considered as more protectionist will have a stronger blocking minority and 
thereby their hand will be strengthened. 
As rightly said this will require new negotiations of the existing EU Treaty 
which will therefore mean that Brexit negotiations will become all that 
much more complex since the question of the voting rights and relative 
voting strength between the different Member States will have to be 
addressed before the UK’s withdrawal. 
Having said this, I would like to link, for one moment, this whole question 
with what I said before relating to the future of the European Union.  
Continuing to speak of the European equilibrium in terms of blocking 
minorities may not be the right way forward for the European Union. After 
all, if there is a blocking minority against ‘free trade’ on one side and there 
is a blocking minority against ‘protectionism’ on the other side, to mention 
one example of the possible use of blocking minorities, would normally 
mean that progress in either direction would be extremely difficult, and 
would consequently entail a lot of horse-trading and a very realistic risk of 
progressing at the pace of the least common denominator.  
In the discussions on the future of the European Union the occasion should 
therefore be grasped to seek solutions on the decision-making process that 
are less dependent on blocking minorities intended to stall progress, and 
that rely more on the building of proper mechanisms the purpose of which 
would be to narrow the gap between divergent positions and to facilitate 
the adoption of common positions.   
 
 
 
82  Ibid ft. note 82. 
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The Mediterranean Reality 
I would now like to dedicate the last part of my intervention on the 
Mediterranean, with particular focus on the contribution that the Maltese 
Presidency of the Council of the EU has made, or could have made, 
towards the unfolding of more intense Euro-Mediterranean relations in the 
years to come. 
For Malta, the Mediterranean is where we are, it is what we are. It, 
therefore, goes without saying, that the Mediterranean cannot but be an 
absolute priority for the Maltese Presidency. In a paper published just 
before the end of 2016, I said that: 
“This makes sense, because of Malta’s location and its history and because, 
in any case, the subject is very topical with the whole question of migration 
and the huge security concerns that exist within and around the region. The 
last time that a Presidency was held by a Member State, which had an 
immediate interest in the Mediterranean, was in 2014, when it was held by 
Greece in the first six months and then by Italy in the second six months. 
The next time around will be in 2020 when Croatia will be at the helm.”83 
Malta’s turn to hold the Presidency of the Council once again will only 
come in 203084. This occasion was therefore a golden opportunity for Malta 
to leave its own strong mark on the future development of Euro-
Mediterranean relations. Has Malta managed to do so? 
There were, first of all, the immediate grave problems rife within the 
Mediterranean that needed urgent attention. The strengthening of all 
existing modes of cooperation and the building of new ones on the security 
front; the framing of terms for an agreement on the whole migration ordeal; 
the clampdown of people trafficking and the organised crime connected 
therewith; and the fight against terrorism; were all matters that needed to be 
addressed straightaway. 
On the 3 February of this year, only one month into the Maltese 
Presidency, a European Council meeting was convened in Malta on the 
 
83  Dr Joe Borg, “Euro-Mediterranean Relations – Malta’s Forthcoming EU Presidency: Personal 
Reflections” in Perspectives in a Changing Mediterranean, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic 
Studies, Med Agenda – Special Issue, MEDAC Publications in Mediterranean IR and Diplomacy, 
pg. 7. 
84  Online at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_the_Council_of_the_European_Union. 
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question of the migration crisis. In their conclusions, the members of the 
European Council expressed their determination “to take additional action 
to significantly reduce migratory flows along the Central Mediterranean 
route and break the business model of smugglers, while remaining vigilant 
about the eastern Mediterranean as well as other routes”85. The stabilisation 
of Libya was also addressed. A ten-point plan was agreed and additional 
funds were mobilised for the purpose 86 . Again, the European Council 
Meeting of the 9 March addressed Security and Defence and, once again, 
the migration crisis87. 
During the course of the six-month Maltese Presidency stint, new measures 
updating and extending the tools available to Member States to respond to 
the evolving threat of terrorism were approved. The final green light was 
given for a new Regulation aimed at further securing EU borders88 and the 
finalisation of a European Travel Information and Authorisation System is 
expected in the coming months89. Progress was registered on the entry-exit 
system of passengers in the European Union, agreement on which is 
expected shortly 90 . Once implemented these instruments will enhance 
external border control and internal security. Progress was made on the, so 
called, Seahorse Mediterranean Network, which is a satellite based 
 
85  Informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government in Malta, “Malta Declaration by the 
members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central 
Mediterranean route”, 3 February 2017, paragraph 3. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
press-releases-pdf/2017/2/47244654402_en.pdf. 
86  Ibid ft. note 86. 
87  Conclusions by the President of the European Council, 9 March 2017, at pages 4 and 5. Online at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/09-conclusion-pec/. 
88  General Affairs Council, Brussels, 7 March 2017, pg. 8, “Schengen, checks at external borders”. 
Online at: https://www.google.com/search?q=Council+of+Ministers+7+march+2017&ie=utf-
8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b-ab; https://www.eu2017.mt/en/news/Pages/Securing-the-EU%E2% 
80%99s-borders-EU-agrees-to-bolster-checks.aspx. 
89  Justice and Home Affairs Council, Luxembourg, 9 June 2017, at page 12, “European Travel 
Information and Authorisation System”. Online at: https://www.google.com/search?  
q=Home+Affairs+Council%2C+9+June+2017&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b-ab;  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/09-etias/. 
90  Briefing, EU Legislation Process, June 2017, European Parliament, “Smart Borders: EU Entry/Exit 
System”. Online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586614EPRS_ 
BRI%282016%29586614_EN.pdf. 
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communication infrastructure scheduled to become operative during the 
course of this year91. 
Mention should also be made of the mobilisation of funds to the tune of 
200 million Euro for the North Africa window of the EU Trust Fund for 
Africa for projects in 2017 with a priority focus for migration related 
projects concerning Libya92. Furthermore, agreement was reached by the 
Council for additional funding, of up to 3.7 billion Euro, to be provided by 
the European Investment Bank for projects outside the EU which address 
the root causes of migration and the needs of transit and host 
communities93.  
On the 24 April, a directive on the control of the acquisition and the 
possession of weapons, especially the most dangerous ones, was adopted 
by the Justice and Home Affairs Council94, which revises and compliments 
the existing directive 91/477/EEC95. On the 20 June, the same Council also 
adopted a regulation amending regulation (EC) No. 1693/9596 laying down 
a uniform format for visas97. More recently, the European Council meeting 
of the 22 and 23 June stressed the EU’s determination to fight the spread of 
 
91  Online at: https://digit.site36.net/2017/04/25/migration-monitoring-in-the-mediterranean-region-
libyan-military-to-be-linked-up-to-european-surveillance-systems/. Commission response to a 
question made by the European Parliament. Online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/ 
getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2017-000223&language=EN. 
92  European Commission, Press Release, Brussels, 28 July 2017, “EU Trust Fund for Africa adopts 
Euro 46 million programme to support integrated migration and border management in Libya”. 
Online at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2187_en.htm. Joint Communication to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, “Migration on the Central 
Mediterranean route – Managing flows, saving lives”. Brussels, 25.1.2017, JOIN (2017) 4 final, sub-
title 7 at page 15 (doc). Online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=JOIN%3 
A2017%3A4%3AFIN. 
93  Council (Justice and Home Affairs/Foreign Affairs and International Relations/Economy and 
Finance), 5 April 2017, Press Release 190/17, “EIB: Council agrees to increase funding to address 
migration issues”. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/05-
eib-migration-funding-increased/. 
94  Justice and Home Affairs Council, 24 April 2017, Press Release 213/17, “EU strengthens control of 
the acquisition and possession of firearms”. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/ 
press-releases/2017/04/25-control-acquisition-possession-weapons/. 
95  Online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX: 31991L0477 
&from=EN. 
96  Online at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995R1683: 
EN:HTML. 
97  Justice and Home Affairs Council, 20 June 2017, Press Release 388/17, “Uniform format for short-
stay visas (Schengen): Council adopts regulation on the update of security features in the visa 
sticker”. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/20-uniform-
format-short-stay-visas/. 
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radicalisation online and that it expects the Industry to develop new 
technology and tools to improve the automatic detection and removal of 
content that incites terrorist acts; which may be complemented by 
legislative measures at EU level, if necessary98.  
The European Council also reaffirmed its previous conclusions on the 
reform of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and stressed that 
there is a common understanding that the reformed CEAS needs to strike 
the right balance between responsibility and solidarity and that it needs to 
ensure resilience to future crises and provide adequate support to the most 
affected Member States. The European Council then called for work to be 
carried out on an EU list of safe third countries which will be part of a 
future overall agreement on the Common European Asylum System99. 
In furtherance of the Union’s determination to tackle migration from all 
angles, the European Commission launched infringement procedures, on 
the 13 June of this year, against the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
for failing to fulfil their commitment on the reallocation and resettlement 
process100. 
On more general lines, the European Council agreed to step up cooperation 
and delivery on all the elements contained in the Malta Declaration101, the 
Partnership Framework102 and the Joint Valletta Action Plan103, which are 
to be underpinned by sufficient financial resources104. 
 
98  European Council meeting (22/23 June 2017) – Conclusions, Title I – Security and Defence – paras. 
1 and 2. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/23-euco-
conclusions/.  
99  Ibid ft. note 99 – Title IV – Migration – para. 23. 
100 Online at: http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/eu-opens-sanctions-procedure 
-against-hungary-poland-and-czech-republic-over-refugees/. 
101  Informal meeting of EU Heads of State or Government in Malta, “Malta Declaration by the 
members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central 
Mediterranean route”, 3 February 2017. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-
pdf/2017/2/47244654402_en.pdf. 
102  Online at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2072_en.htm; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-17-1595_en.htm. 
103  European Council, Valletta, 11-12 November 2015, Valletta Summit on Migration – action plan and 
political declaration. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit  
/2015/11/11-12/. 
104  Ibid ft. note 99 – Title IV – Migration – para 21. 
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All this goes to show that the Maltese Presidency has done its utmost to 
spur the European Union on to address the immediate plights of the 
Mediterranean. At the end of the European Council of the 22 and 23 June, 
President Tusk described the work undertaken by the Maltese Presidency 
on migration and security as “impressive and excellent” work105. 
It is also opportune to recall at this stage what the President of the 
European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, said the day before the 
commencement of the same European Council. He stressed that a serious 
response to the migration crisis “calls for a comprehensive European 
strategy which goes to the root of the problem…On the one hand, we must 
step up external border controls, which will require us to increase the 
resources made available to the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency...On the other hand, we must build a new partnership with Africa 
which focuses not only on the challenges, but also on the major 
opportunities for growth on the continent…Against this background it 
would be possible to frame more effective repatriation agreements and – 
together with the United Nations agencies – establish repatriation centres 
south of the Sahara.” He concluded by saying that “[t]his is one more 
reason why Europe needs a proper budget so that funds are available for 
both border control efforts and the development fund for Africa”106. 
While it is a sine qua non to tackle the immediate problems, it is just as 
essential to focus on the long term for the Mediterranean, on the future 
shape and form of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
Malta could have adopted one of two different approaches – either that of 
seeking to improve what we already have in place or that of going back to 
the drawing board to map out something new.  
The latter approach would have meant the formulation of a new template 
upon which future Euro-Med relations would be based, accompanied by an 
overhaul of the existing ones. On the other hand, the former approach 
simply means going for more of the same with the ‘Euro-Mediterranean 
 
105  Online at: https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170623/local/maltese-presidency-of-the-
eu-was-efficient-and-impressive-donald-tusk.651484. 
106  Article by Antonio Tajani which appeared in the Times of Malta online of the 21 June 2017. Online 
at: https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170621/opinion/Time-for-real-answers.651258.  
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Partnership’107, the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’108 and the ‘Union for 
the Mediterranean’109 continuing to occupy centre stage. 
I would like to repeat here what I wrote in a short publication that appeared 
in March of this year on these two approaches. I remarked that, by opting 
for more of the same, “one may argue that what we have in place has 
worked well in times when the going was good and that we should simply 
fine tune what we already have in place. Whilst doing so, we may also 
propose new initiatives on the cultural and socioeconomic fronts or on any 
of the other fronts to supplement the pool of initiatives that already 
exist”110.  
On the other hand, by opting for an overhaul, for something new, “one may 
argue that, based on the logic that even when the going was good, what 
there is in place did not work well enough, now that the going is far worse, 
what we have in place is not working at all. We therefore need to come up 
with something new, either to completely replace the Union for the 
Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy or to at least 
change whatever is not working within those instruments with something 
that can work”111. 
The first approach, that of seeking to improve what we already have in 
place, makes sense and is less risky for any Presidency since some success 
may always be registered, no matter how measured it may be. Taking up 
the challenge presented by the other approach and achieving a successful 
outcome is far easier said than done. 
If the riskier approach were to be attempted, a successful outcome would 
be possible if the process is not driven by one set of players and the agenda 
is not set by one of the sides only. I firmly believe that co-ownership of the 
initiative should dictate matters and that it should be founded on a genuine 
sense of co-operation between all parties which should continue to prevail 
 
107 Online at: http://www.barcelona.com/barcelona_news/the_barcelona_process_or_euro_ 
Mediterranean_partnership. 
108  Online at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/overview_en. 
109  Online at: http://ufmsecretariat.org/who-we-are/. 
110  Online at: https://www.eu2017.mt/en/Blog/Pages/Euro-Mediterranean-relations.aspx? 
IsPrintPrev=1; http://www.eu2017.mt/en/Blog/Pages/Euro-Mediterranean-relations.aspx. 
111  Ibid ft. note 111. 
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at all times so that it will be, and will be perceived to be, the motive force 
behind the whole initiative.  
The Maltese Presidency could have laid the groundwork and the 
foundations for this to happen. We did not, and we opted instead to go for 
more of the same.   
To the Maltese Presidency’s credit, I counted at least six Ministerial or 
High-Level meetings, held during the Presidency in Malta, with a focus on 
the strengthening of existing Euro-Mediterranean relations. They dealt with 
a number of instruments and initiatives such as blue growth and ocean 
governance, the water agenda, research and innovation and energy 
efficiency in the Mediterranean112. 
Furthermore, approval has been given by the EU’s Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper) to a provisional deal between the 
European Parliament and the Maltese Presidency which entails EU 
participation in the so-called PRIMA Initiative (The Partnership for 
 
112  (1) Union for the Mediterranean Senior Officials Meeting and Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF), 7 
March 2017, Malta, 53rd Board of Governors Meeting. Online at: https://www.eu2017.mt/en/ 
Events/Pages/Union-for-the-Mediterranean-Senior-Officials%E2%80%99-Meeting-and-Anna-
Lindh-Foundation-(ALF)-53rd-Board-of-Governors-Meeting.aspx;  
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2017-03-08/local-news/Malta-reinforcing-historic-
vocation-as-a-catalyst-of-an-innovative-vision-in-the-Med-George-Vella-6736171394. 
  (2) BLUEMED Initiative –Technical Meeting, Malta, 19 April 2017, “A Basin of Research and 
Innovation for Sustainable Growth. Online at: https://www.eu2017.mt/en/Events/Pages/BLUEMED- 
Technical-Meeting.aspx. 
(3) Informal Ministerial Meeting, 20 April 2018, Malta, Blue Growth and Ocean Governance in the 
EU and the Mediterranean – Innovation and Nautical Tourism. Online at: https://www.eu2017.mt/  
en/Events/Pages/BLUEMED-Technical-Meeting.aspx. 
(4) Ministerial Meeting of the European Union and Mediterranean Water Ministers, 27 April 2017, 
Malta. Online at: https://www.eu2017.mt/en/Events/Pages/Ministerial-Meeting-of-the-European-
Union-and-Mediterranean-Water-Ministries.aspx;  
http://www.swim-h2020.eu/27-april-2017-valetta-malta-ministerial-meeting-of-the-european-union-
and-mediterranean-water-ministries/. 
(5) Informal High-Level Meeting on Energy Efficiency in the Mediterranean, 19 May 2017, Malta. 
Online at: https://www.eu2017.mt/en/Events/Pages/Informal-High-Level-Meeting-on- 
Energy-Efficiency-in-the-Mediterranean.aspx; 
http://ufmsecretariat.org/fostering-energy-efficiency-solutions-in-the-mediterranean-high-level-
meeting-to-be-held-in-malta/. 
(6) Space Solutions for Resilience in the Mediterranean, 27 June 2017, Malta. Online at:  
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2017-06-28/local-news/Satellite-data-important-tool-to-
tackle-global-humanitarian-migration-security-challenges-6736175988. 
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Research and Innovation in the Mediterranean Area) 113 , and which 
currently involves 11 EU Member States and 8 non-EU Mediterranean 
Countries.  
The Maltese Presidency did not attempt the more challenging approach 
possibly because it suspected that there was no appetite in the European 
Union and in the Arab world for any radical change, for any new approach, 
to Euro-Med relations.  
Conclusion  
I would like to hope that the reflections on the future of the European 
Union; the discussions on the immediate concerns involving the 
Mediterranean and on the strengthening of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation 
commenced or furthered during the Maltese Presidency; will lead to 
outcomes in the years to come that will be in the best long-term interests of 
the European Union and of the Mediterranean. I also would like to wish 
that the Brexit negotiations will be concluded positively for all and that we 
will manage to turn the page and move on without acrimony. 
 
 
113  Coreper, 26 April 2017, Press Release 215/17, “EU-Mediterranean Partnership for food and water 
projects: Coreper approves the ‘PRIMA’ initiative”. Online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ 
press/press-releases/2017/04/26-prima-food-water/. 
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